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C ONSISTENT with past Annual Survey Articles on Commercial Trans-
actions, this year's Annual Survey concentrates on court opinions that
interpret and apply the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Texas.'
Because the current survey period spanned a legislative session,2 pertinent
legislative enactments have also been included throughout.
The number of reported cases during this survey period has remained
about the same in most areas involving commercial transactions, but cases
involving chapter 4 and chapter 5 banking law subjects have increased.
Whether this increase is merely by chance or whether it reflects the begin-
ning of a new'trend can only be speculated upon at present.3 As a result of
the growth in this area, chapter 4 and 5 cases have been separated from the
Commercial Paper topic this year and accorded a Banking Law subdivi-
sion of their own.4
A useful feature incorporated in last year's Commercial Transactions
survey by Professor Winship was the listing of new publications on com-
mercial law.5 This practice has been continued by the present author, and
new publications of interest to commercial lawyers have been collected in
the accompanying footnote.6
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code first became effective in Texas on July I, 1966.
1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 721, at 1-316. In 1967 it became part of the Texas Business &
Commerce Code. As amended, the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code now
conforms closely to the 1972 Official Text. In this Article, all references are to the Uniform
Commercial Code as enacted in chapters one through eleven of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code [hereinafter referred to as the Code]. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980).
2. The 1979 regular session of the legislature was convened Jan. 9, 1979, and ad-
journed May 28, 1979.
3. Recent approval of standby letters of credit by federal bank regulatory authorities
may account for some of the increase in the area of letters of credit. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160
(1979) (Comptroller of the Currency); id § 208.8(d) (Federal Reserve Board); id § 337.2
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
4. See text accompanying notes 129-51 infra.
5. See Winship, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J.
203, 203 n.4 (1979).
6. The publications include W. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER (2d ed. 1979); R.
RIEGART & R. BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE (3d ed. 1978); and C. REITZ, CONSUMER
PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSON-Moss WARRANTY ACT (1978). A second edition of J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1972) was published in February 1980.
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I. SALES TRANSACTIONS
A. Statute of Frauds
Chapter 2 contains its own Statute of Frauds provision designed specifi-
cally to deal with some of the unique problems that can arise in alleged
oral contracts for the sale of goods.7 A recent federal district court case
has explored some of the exceptions and limitations of the chapter 2 Stat-
ute of Frauds.8 In Rockland Industries, Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Associates9
the buyer brought suit against the seller on a claimed oral contract under
which the seller was to supply the buyer's requirement for specified pat-
terns for a two-year term. The seller asserted section 2.201, the Statute of
Frauds, as a bar to the enforcement of the alleged oral agreement. To
avoid the effect of the Statute, the buyer advanced three theories: two ex-
ceptions to section 2.201 and one limitation. First, the buyer claimed that
a letter that he sent to the seller in March 1977, referring to a claimed July
1976 agreement between the parties, operated to take the requirements
contract out of section 2.201 as a "writing [sent between merchants] in con-
firmation of the contract."' 0 The court rejected this theory because the
exception requires such a confirmation to be sent within a reasonable
time."I Absent proof to the contrary by the buyer, the unexplained time
lapse of eight months went well beyond the limit of a confirmation sent
within a reasonable time.12 The second exception urged by the buyer was
that the seller had admitted the existence of the contract in court by offer-
ing in evidence various letters concerning the alleged contract, bringing the
case within section 2.201(c)(2). The court held that the letters, at most,
were merely descriptive of the buyer's legal position and did not constitute
an admission that such legal position was sound. 13 The third theory ad-
vanced by the buyer was that the doctrine of promissory estoppel operated
to bar the seller from raising the Statute of Frauds as a defense. The court
recognized that section 1.103 permits the principles of law and equity to
supplement the Code and that there was authority applying the doctrine of
promissory estoppel to the chapter 2 Statute of Frauds.14 The buyer con-
tended that the doctrine could be invoked whenever a promise to perform
induces detrimental reliance.' 5 The court, however, took a more limited
position, supported by section 178 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, that promissory estoppel was applicable to preclude a Statute of
Frauds defense only when a misrepresentation was made that a contract
had been or would be reduced to writing. Because the buyer had made no
7. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Vernon 1968).
8. Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Assocs., 470 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
9. Id
10. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Vernon 1968).
11. Id. Section 1.240(b) provides "[w]hat is a reasonable time for taking any action
depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action."
12. 470 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
13. Id at 1180-81.
14. Id at 1179 (noting J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 59-60 (1972) and cases cited therein).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1973).
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such claim nor had shown any evidence of such misrepresentation, the
promissory estoppel theory was rejected.16
B. Interpretation of Sales Contracts
One of the most significant problems arising after the formation of a
contract is the problem of interpretation. The parties may recognize that
they have a contract, but often will dispute its meaning. Because each
party will favor an interpretation enhancing its own legal position, chapter
2 includes an elaborate system of rules that incorporate the conduct of the
parties and established methods of dealing in their trade as further, and
perhaps more objective, interpretive tools.17 Three cases during the survey
period demonstrate the importance of these interpretive tools. 18
Usage of Trade. In Raney v. Uvalde Producers Wool & Mohair Co.' 9 the
primary contention raised by the seller-defendant on appeal was that a
contract calling for the delivery of 25,000 mohair fleeces was satisfied by
delivery of that number of fleeces. At trial, the buyer had been allowed to
introduce evidence of an established trade usage in the mohair industry
that the word "fleeces" meant fleeces of fixed average weight and that the
seller's delivery of 41,000 pounds of mohair was 46,500 pounds below the
amount required to fulfill the contract based on the "average weight per
fleece" meaning in the industry. The San Antonio court of civil appeals
held that the introduction of trade usage evidence was proper under the
Code's parol evidence rule20 and that, as a long-time producer of mohair,
the seller could be expected to know of this usage as a "merchant" in the
trade. 2' The contract was, therefore, to be read in light of how parties in
the mohair trade do business, and, on that basis, the seller was found to be
in breach to the extent of the 46,500 pound shortage in delivery.
In Salinas v. Flores22 evidence of trade usage was determinative of
whether, when watermelons were sold "by the patch" during the growing
season, control of the melons remained with the seller or passed to the
buyer. Relying upon what it termed "ample" and "overwhelming" evi-
16. 470 F. Supp. at 1180.
17. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.205, 2.202, .208 (Vernon 1968).
18. Salinas v. Flores, 583 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ);
Krupp Organization v. Belin Communities, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979, no writ); Raney v. Uvalde Producers Wool & Mohair Co., 571 S.W.2d 199
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
19. 571 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
20. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202 (Vernon 1968) provides:
Terms. . . set forth in writing intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agreement . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agree-
ment or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or sup-
plemented (1) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1.205) or by
course of performance (Section 2.208) . ...
21. 571 S.W.2d at 200-01. That a person engaged in agricultural or livestock production
can qualify as a "merchant" within the meaning of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.104(a)
(Vernon 1968) was established in Nelson v. Union Equity Co-op. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352
(Tex. 1977), notedin 31 Sw. L.J. 1150 (1977); 8 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 181 (1977).
22. 583 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
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dence, the court held that control over and responsibility for the care of the
watermelons passed to the buyer when they were sold by the patch, pro-
vided that both parties were aware of this trade understanding. 23 Because
of this practice in the trade, the court also held that under the Code provi-
sions on risk of loss, the party in control of the goods, here, the buyer, bore
the loss when the melons were destroyed by hail.24 Section 2.613 dealing
with casualty to identified goods was held inapplicable because, under its
terms, it operated only when "the goods suffer casualty without fault of
either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer .... -25 It is worth
noting that the risk of loss and casualty provisions of the Code came into
play on the facts of this case only after the interpretation issue had been
resolved by evidence of trade usage.
Course of Performance. The third case of the series dealt not with usage of
trade but with what the particular contracting parties did during the course
of a contract calling for repeated occasions of performance, i e., course of
performance. In Krupp Organization v. Belin Communities, Inc.26 the
plaintiff-seller sought recovery for the loss of anticipated profits on an al-
leged contract to print and mail 250,000 advertising brochures. The buyer
contended that the actual contract as finally agreed upon by the parties
was for the printing and mailing of only 50,000 brochures and introduced
evidence of the invoice charges made by the seller at various stages of the
printing and mailing runs. The invoices showed the assessment of an addi-
tional charge during each stage, apparently reflecting the increased cost of
smaller printing runs. On the basis of testimony linking the additional
charge more directly to the cost of smaller printing runs, the trial court
held that the course of performance evidence supported the buyer's con-
tention that the actual agreement of the parties was for the reduced quanti-
ty of brochures. On appeal, the court noted with approval the use of
evidence of course of performance to resolve conflicting oral and docu-
mentary evidence regarding the contract terms. "[T]he parties know best
what they mean and ... their actions under their agreement are the best
indication of its meaning. '27
C. Warranties
Legislative Developments. Section 2.316 of the Code, dealing with the ex-
clusion and modification of warranties, was amended during the 1979 leg-
islative session to exclude all warranties of merchantability and fitness for
a particular purpose in the "sale or barter of livestock or its unborn
23. Id at 815.
24. Id The provisions on risk of loss are contained in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 2.509, .510 (Vernon 1968).
25. 583 S.W.2d at 815 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 2.613 (Vernon 1968)
(emphasis added)).
26. 582 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, no writ).
27. Id at 519 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §2.208, comment I (Vernon 1968),




Tort, Contract, or Deceptive Trade Practice. Last year's Annual Survey ar-
ticle dealt extensively with the continuing attempts by the courts to de-
velop a rational line of distinction between tort theory and contract theory
in those cases that seem to involve both.29 Unfortunately, there have been
no significant new case developments in the area since the decision in Mid
Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc.,30 which
was commented upon as a late inclusion in last year's Survey. 31 As Profes-
sor Grant Gilmore has pointed out, the law on this subject seems to have
progressed to the stage where traditional tort/contract distinctions have
been abandoned, and we now have a cause of action which he calls a "con-
tort."' 32 The boundaries in this area are still obscure, and no new cases
have helped to clarify them during the last year.
Adding to the difficulty of making rational distinctions is the continued
inclusion of breach of warranty claims in the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act (DTPA). 33 Although the DTPA was amended during the last
legislative session to eliminate the automatic trebling of actual damages, 34
the theoretical basis for treating a warranty breach as a deceptive trade
practice is still unexplained. 35 In the warranty and deceptive trade prac-
tices area, the point was made in last year's Annual Survey article that
28. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 99, § I, at 190.
29. Winship, supra note 5, at 208-10.
30. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
31. Winship, supra note 5, at 208-09.
32. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 90 (1974).
33. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980). See also Dor-
saneo, Creditor and Consumer Rights, p. 253 infra; Lynn, Of White Knights and Black
Knights" An Analysis of the 1979 Amendments to the Texas Trade Practices Act, 33 Sw. L.J.
941 (1980).
34. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 603, § 4, at 1330.
35. As originally enacted, § 17.50(a)(2) provided that "A consumer may maintain an
action if he has been adversely affected by. . .(2) afalure by anyperson to comply with an
express or implied warranty." 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 17.50(a)(2), at 326 (emphasis
added). An amendment in 1977 changed the italicized language to "breach of' an express
or implied warranty, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, § 5, at 603; and the 1979 amendments
(1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 603, § 4, at 1329) did not further modify the phrase.
Chapter 2's concept of a warranty breach clearly contemplates that the breach normally
occurs upon tender of delivery. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Vernon 1968).
While express warranties might be distinguished because they come into existence by repre-
sentations of the seller, it seems unduly harsh to impose treble damages for the breach of an
implied warranty when that breach occurs instantly upon tender of delivery. The former
language of the statute between 1973 and 1977 made more sense because it could be said
that a seller who "failed to comply" with the terms of a warranty (e.g., refused to remedy or
repair the discovered defect) had, acting with knowledge that a breach had taken place,
engaged in a voluntary act (refusal to remedy) that might fairly be treated as a deceptive
trade practice. The existence of a punitive deceptive trade practices remedy, at least for
simple breach of implied warranties, does not seem logically justified, but such a remedy
does seem proper for refusals to comply with warranty terms once the fact of breach is
known. Some procedural safeguards have been added to the DTPA that help to limit its
otherwise harsh remedies. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.50A, .50B (Vernon
Supp. 1980) ("opportunity to cure" defense). These safeguards, however, are not directly
responsive to the question of whether breach of implied warranty is properly the subject of
deceptive trade practice regulation.
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"actions by 'consumers' for breach of Code warranties should now rou-
tinely include a reference to the DTPA as well as the relevant Code provi-
sions."' 36 The validity of this point is well-illustrated by the case of Valley
Datsun v. Martinez.37 In Valley Datsun the buyer brought suit on theories
of unconscionability, breach of implied warranty, and breach of express
warranty, all under the damage umbrella of the DTPA. Lack of evidence
precluded recovery on the unconscionability theory. The implied war-
ranty theory (a marriage of section 2.314 of the Code and section
17.50(a)(2) of the DTPA) failed because the buyer knew that the goods
were used, a fact that precluded the creation of an implied warranty.38
The assertion by a salesman that the goods were in "excellent condition,"
however, was held not to be "mere 'dealer's talk'" but an affirmation of
fact creating a section 2.313 express warranty, the breach of which brought
the multiple damage remedy of DTPA section 17.50(a)(2) into play.39 The
disappointed buyer recovered treble damages.40 Although treble damages
are no longer mandatory, and procedural limits have been imposed by sec-
tions 17.50A and 17.50B, the "consumer" plaintiff should still include a
DTPA count in warranty actions as a standard practice.4' The plaintiff,
however, should be certain to comply with the procedures of sections
17.50A and 17.50B before filing such an action.42
Warranty of Title. Section 2.312 of the Code provides, in effect, that unless
specifically excluded or modified, the seller warrants title to any goods
conveyed under a contract of sale.4 3 In a case involving a reverse twist on
the usual alignment of seller and buyer in such litigation, Gunderland
36. Winship, supra note 5, at 212.
37. 578 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
38. Although comment 3 to § 2.314 suggests that an implied warranty might arise in the
sale of used goods, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314, comment 3 (Vernon 1968), that
possibility has not met with judicial favor. See Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500
S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
39. 578 S.W.2d at 490. With regard to the type of evidence needed to establish an
express warranty, an interesting contrast to Valley Datsun is Hodge Boats & Motors v. King,
578 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (delivery of the manufac-
turer's warranty to the purchaser by the dealer does not make the dealer a party to the
instrument).
40. 578 S.W.2d at 491.
41. The mandatory treble damages provision in § 17.50(b)(1), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
143, 1, at 326, was changed to permit the award of treble damages only when the trier of fact
finds that the conduct of the defendant was committed "knowingly." 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws,
ch. 603, § 4, at 1330 (codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp.
1980)).
Quotation marks have been included around the word "consumer" in the text because,
under the very broad definition in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN, § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp.
1980), anyone can qualify as a "consumer." Cf. W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580
S.W.2d 76 (Tex.Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (lessee of computer considered
"consumer" in action for alleged breach of express and implied warranties). For a discus-
sion of Weaver see notes 52-60 infra and accompanying text.
42. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.50A (Vernon Supp. 1980) establishes special procedu-
ral requirements, including a 30-day prelitigation notice, that must be met before a deceptive
trade practices claim may be properly maintained.
43. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312 (Vernon 1968).
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Marine Supply, Inc. v. Bray,44 the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals
held that a person who traded in a used boat to a boat dealer as part of the
purchase price of a new boat impliedly warranted that he had good title to
the trade-in property.45 The warranty of good title was implied despite
evidence showing the relative professional status of the buyer vis-a-vis the
amateur status of the seller. The court noted that amendments to the
Texas Parks and Wildlife Code regarding the issuance of certificates of
title on boats had been passed subsequent to the facts in the case so that
only the provisions of section 2.312 were controlling.46 The court had no
difficulty in concluding that the trade-in was a "sale" within the terms of
chapter 2. 47
Notice of Breach. An important element in preserving a breach of war-
ranty claim is giving the seller notice of the breach.48 Proof that such no-
tice was given is of equal importance. While this should be elementary
commercial law, cases still arise that indicate that the Code's notice re-
quirements can be a trap for the unwary. In Cox v. Mesa Petroleum Co.49
the buyer failed to show that notice of breach had been given within a
reasonable time after he discovered or should have discovered the claimed
breach. His failure to submit these issues to the trier of fact barred any
recovery. The seller's failure to deny under oath the receipt of any notice
did not cause the fact of notice to be deemed admitted under rule 93 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 50 Proof of notice was part of the buyer's
case, and the court held that rule 93 is inapplicable to contracts that do not
prescribe a time limit within which notice must be given as a prerequisite
to suit. 5'
Exclusion of Warranties. Of all the warranty cases reported this year, WR.
44. 570 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
45. Id at 546.
46. Id The legislation referred to by the court is TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN.
§ 31.045 (Vernon Supp. 1980). Further amendments regarding the issuance of certificates of
title on boats were passed in the 1979 legislative session and are discussed at note 175 infra
and accompanying text. The amateur/professional distinction asserted by the seller can
come into play if certificates of title are used. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.103(b)(4) & comment 4(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
47. 570 S.W.2d at 545. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.304(a) (Vernon 1968) pro-
vides that " [t]he price can be made payable in whole or in part in money or otherwise. If it
is payable in whole or in part in goods each party is a seller of the goods which he is to
transfer." The holding in Gunderland Marine is consistent with the proposition advanced in
last year's Survey. See Winship, supra note 5, at 205-06.
48. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §2.607(c)(1) (Vernon 1968).
49. 572 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
50. Id at 113. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(m) states that
[a] pleading setting up any of the following matters, unless the truth of such
matters appear of record, shall be verified by affidavit.
(m) That notice and proof of loss or claim for damage has not been given, as
alleged. Unless such plea is filed such notice and proof shall be presumed and
no evidence to the contrary shall be admitted. A denial of such notice or such
proof shall be made specifically and with particularity.
51. 572 S.W.2d at 113.
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Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp.5 2 is the most interesting, and, if litigation
in the case continues, it has the potential to become a landmark decision
affecting contracts for computer software. In 1971 the Weaver Company
entered into a transaction with the Burroughs Corporation to lease a com-
puter from Burroughs, to purchase a "software package" of computer ac-
counting programs from Burroughs, and to have Burroughs systems
personnel work with Weaver to "tailor" the accounting programs to
Weaver's particular requirements. The Burroughs sales contract contained
conspicuous large print warranty disclaimer clauses to satisfy section
2.316, 53 and these same clauses had been held to be effective disclaimers in
other litigation involving Burroughs.54The lease agreement contained sub-
stantially similar disclaimers, but these clauses were printed only in un-
capitalized regular type. In addition to the contract and lease, however,
Weaver demanded assurances about the overall operation of the total sys-
tem. In response, Burroughs supplied a "Statement of Installation Condi-
tions," a separate document that provided for the assistance of Burroughs
personnel in tailoring the system and committed Burroughs to provide
software that would "be operable prior to installation." No disclaimers of
any kind were contained in this additional "statement."
There were lengthy delays by Burroughs in providing several of the pro-
grams called for in the software contract, and some of the programs were
never delivered. Finally, in late 1972 or early 1973, Weaver cancelled the
lease agreement and sales contract. On December 21, 1976, Weaver filed
suit against Burroughs, seeking incidental and consequential damages on
theories of breach of express and implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness, strict liability, and violation of the DTPA. Burroughs an-
swered by pleading, inter alia, statute of limitations, disclaimer of warran-
ties, and limitations on damages. The trial court granted Burroughs'
motion for summary judgement.
On appeal, the primary issue was whether there were any genuine issues
of material fact as to one or more of the essential elements of Weaver's
claim. The appellate court held that genuine issues of fact were presented
on: (1) the statute of limitations question because it was not clear when the
alleged breach of warranty occurred; 55 (2) the disclaimer of warranties is-
sue because, while the sales contract and lease agreement disclaimers were
effective,56 the "Statement Installation Conditions" might factually have
been intended as an express warranty that would survive the inconsistent
52. 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
53. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Vernon 1968) contains a "how to do it"
statement of the proper method to use in disclaiming express warranties and the implied
warranties of title, merchantability, and fitness. Boilerplate disclaimers can be readily lo-
cated. See, e.g., 1 TEx. CODE FORMS ANN. § 2.316 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980).
54. Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974); West-
field Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1293 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977);
Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
55. 580 S.W.2d at 80.
56. Id at 81 (citing the cases collected in note 54 supra).
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disclaimers under the operation of section 2.316;57 and (3) the limitation of
remedy issue because of the uncertain factual impact of the "Statement of
Installation Conditions." On the strict liability issue, Weaver conceded
that the Texas Supreme Court holding in Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers
58
precluded recovery of purely economic loss. The DTPA was not dis-
cussed. The summary judgment of the lower court was reversed and the
case remanded for trial.
The potential importance of Weaver lies in the application of Code war-
ranty theory to computer software installation contracts, an increasingly
important area of business activity.59 As computers grow rapidly in so-
phistication and complexity, the design of software systems to adapt com-
puting capability to the needs of particular businesses becomes more and
more important-and more risky.60 The Weaver case does not so much
involve new law as it does the application of old law to a new technology
that is being extended to more businesses (and individuals) every day. A
prediction can be made that, in the future, the courts will be faced with an
increasing number of cases raising difficult issues about how well the old
law fits the new technology, what reshaping of the law needs to be done,
and how far the parties have gone, or can go, in contractually defining
their rights and remedies. If Weaver appears again in the appellate re-
ports, some of these questions may be addressed.
D. Performance Disputes
Substantial Compliance. The doctrine of substantial compliance is a well-
accepted doctrine of general contract law.61 The law of sales is not, how-
ever, general contract law, and an equally long-standing doctrine of sales
law is that "[tlhere is no room in commercial contracts for the doctrine of
substantial performance. '62 The "perfect tender rule" of sales law is car-
ried forward into section 2.601 of the Code, which allows the buyer to
reject goods whenever "goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect
to conform to the contract. '63 There are, however, exceptions to the per-
57. Id at 8 1-82.
58. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977), notedin 15 Hous. L. REV. 435 (1978); 19 S. TEX. L.J.
319 (1978).
59. The subject of computers and the law, in addition to various one volume references,
is now the subject of a ten-volume reporter published by Callaghan & Co. entitled COM-
PUTER LAW SERVICE (1972). The service is updated in much the same way as the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE.
60. See, e.g., IBM v. Catamore Enterprises, Inc., 548 F.2d 1065 (Ist Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977) (plaintiff alleged eighteen million dollars actual damages suf-
fered due to failure of computerized accounting and production control system).
61. See 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 700-12 (1960). The classic illustration is Jacob
& Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889, 175 N.Y.S. 281 (1921). (When identi-
cal quality "Cohoes" pipe was inadvertently substituted by builder instead of specified
"Reading" pipe, the court held that the builder had substantially complied.)
62. Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. J. Aron & Co., 16 F.2d 185, 186 (2d Cir. 1926). The
reasons for the divergence between sales law and general contract law are discussed in R.
NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 102 (1970).
63. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.601 (Vernon 1968).
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fect tender rule.64 Consequently, the burden of proof rests upon the seller
to show either that full performance has occurred or that the case falls
within an exception to the rule.65
In Del Monte Corp. v. Martin66 a farmer entered into a written contract
with a canner to grow, harvest, and deliver hybrid "fancy grade" spinach.
Upon tender by the farmer, the canner rejected the crop, and the farmer
then sued for breach. At trial, the court submitted the case to the jury with
instructions to determine if the plaintiff had "substantially complied with
the terms of the contract. '67 The court refused to submit the defendant's
special issues designed to determine specifically if the spinach tendered by
the plaintiff was of "fancy grade." The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff for actual damages and punitive damages for willful and mali-
cious rejection. On appeal, the court of civil appeals approved the use of
the substantial compliance standard without discussion or analysis of the
differences between that doctrine and the perfect tender rule applicable to
sales contracts.68 The punitive damage award was reversed because there
was no evidence to support a finding of willful or malicious rejection.
Although the decision may be correct on its facts, and the same result
might have been reached under an analysis of the perfect tender rule and
its exceptions, the use of the substantial compliance standard should be
deplored because it obscures analysis of sales law principles and in-
troduces an element of uncertainty to the framework of chapter 2.
Excused Performance. In contrast to the failure of the Del Monte court to
apply sales law to a sales case, Robberson Steel, Inc. v. JD. Abrams, Inc.69
is a carefully reasoned opinion analyzing and applying the appropriate
theories of chapter 2 to a claim of excused performance by reason of the
failure of presupposed conditions under section 2.615. In Robberson the
buyer sued for damages caused by a six-month delay in the delivery of
fabricated steel to be used in the construction of bridges. The seller
claimed that the delay was excused because of its inability to obtain
fabricating steel from the steel mills. The test for applying such excuse in
section 2.615(1) is whether "performance as agreed has been made imprac-
ticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made." There was un-
disputed evidence that the seller checked with two steel mills about sup-
plies before entering into the fabrication contract, and that, having
64. For example, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.508 (Vernon 1968) allows the seller
to cure a defective delivery in certain circumstances. Other exceptions are discussed in R.
NORDSTROM, supra note 62, §§ 103-05.
65. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 62, at § 102.
66. 574 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
67. Id at 598.
68. The court did not address whether the Code was applicable to the case, and, conse-
quently, the relevant provisions of the Code were not discussed. The applicable scope provi-
sions are found at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.102, .103, .105, .106 (Vernon 1968),
§ 2.107 (Vernon Supp. 1980). See generaly R. NORDSTROM, supra note 62, §§ 20-22.
69. 582 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
[Vol. 34
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
received assurances, he failed to include a contract clause excusing per-
formance in the event of a failure of supply. In a lengthy and carefully
researched opinion, the court of appeals concluded that "[tjhe evidence
established that the contingency which developed was one which the par-
ties could reasonably have foreseen and it was one of that variety of risks
which the parties tacitly assigned to the promisor by their failure to pro-
vide for it explicitly."'70 The judgment of the trial court rejecting the
claimed defense was affirmed.
E. Remedies
Seller's Resale and Damagesfor Nonacceptance. In Wirth, Ltd v. Panhan-
dle Pipe & Steel, Inc.71 a buyer refused to accept delivery of steel, and the
seller, in an attempt to utilize section 2.706 of the Code, resold the steel
and sued for the difference between the contract price and the resale price.
The trial court held that the seller had failed to resell the steel in a com-
mercially reasonable manner as required by section 2.706 and, further,
that the seller had offered no evidence of market price to justify recovery
on a contract/market difference theory under section 2.708. These findings
were affirmed on appeal. The opinion does not discuss exactly why the
resale failed to meet the test of commercial reasonableness. This is unfor-
tunate because the standard of "commercially reasonable" resale is also
used in chapter 9 for the resale of collateral and has been frequently liti-
gated, while the 2.706 standard has been raised only sporadically. 72 It
would be beneficial for the courts to develop the chapter 2 standard further
to assist contracting parties in knowing whether the two standards are not
only verbally but also legally identical or whether the different contexts of
sales and secured transactions may cause functional differences in the ap-
plication of the standards. 73
II. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Form of Negotiable Instruments-Incomplete Instruments
Chapter 3 is the most formalistic of all the chapters in the Code. Any
writing, to be a negotiable instrument under chapter 3, must: (1) be signed
70. Id at 564.
71. 580 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
72. Resale of collateral under ch. 9 is governed by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.504 (Vernon Supp. 1980). Even a brief comparison of the annotations collected for id
§ 2.706 (Vernon 1968 and Supp. 1980) with those collected for id § 9.504 (Vernon Supp.
1980) shows the remarkable disparity in frequency of litigation. The annotations in the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CASE DIGEST (John W. Willis ed. 1976) for the respective
sections shows a similar disparity on the national level.
73. One theoretical difference, for example, might be that resale of collateral under
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Vernon Supp. 1980) operates to deprive a debtor of
a current equity ownership in the collateral being resold while a sale under id § 2.706
(Vernon 1968) does not deprive a buyer of such an ownership interest. The ch. 2 standard of
commercial reasonableness might, therefore, be somewhat less stringent than the ch. 9 stan-
dard.
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by the maker or drawer; (2) contain an unconditional order or promise to
pay a sum certain; (3) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and (4)
be payable to order or bearer.74 In Hoss v. Fabacher7" the plaintiff
brought suit on an instrument in which the payee's name had been omitted
and the sum certain had not been stated. Citing sections 3.104, 3.111,76
and 3.115, 77 the court held that the writing was not a negotiable instrument
but an incomplete instrument. 78 The plaintiff therefore had the burden of
proving all matters essential to the claim, including ownership and the
amount allegedly due. The "note" did not operate to supply prima facie
proof of the plaintiffs claim when it was incomplete. Because the plaintiff
failed to introduce any evidence other than the incomplete instrument to
prove the amount due or to show any other basis for recovery, the take
nothing judgment of the trial court was affirmed. It is interesting to note
that comment 2 to section 3.111 analyzes an example precisely like that of
the instrument sued on in Hoss and that the indicated result is the same.
79
B. Liabiliy of Parties
Liability of Co-Makers. In Hooper v. Ryan80 the payees on an installment
note brought suit against the two co-makers after default in payment oc-
curred. After the suit was filed, the payees reached a settlement with one
of the co-makers and released him from further liability in the action with-
outmaking an express reservation of rights. The single remaining defend-
ant urged that the release of the co-maker operated to discharge him from
liability on the instrument under section 3.606.81 The trial court appar-
ently accepted this argument and rendered a take nothing judgment
against the plaintiff. On appeal, this decision was reversed and rendered
on the ground that section 3.606 is applicable only to sureties and not to
co-makers. For authority, the court relied exclusively upon Wohihuter v.
St. Charles Lumber & Fuel Co.,82 an Illinois case, and Hallowell v. Tur-
ner,83 an Idaho case. While both cases represent a line of respectable au-
74. Id §§ 3.104(a)(l)-(4) (Vernon 1968).
75. 578 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
76. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.111 (Vernon 1968) provides that an instrument is
payable to bearer only when one of three alternative entries (bearer, specific person or
bearer, cash) is made in the payee space. See also id comment 2 (the section is worded to
remove any possible implication that "Pay to the order of " makes the instru-
ment payable to bearer; it is an incomplete order instrument and falls under § 3.115).
77. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.115 (Vernon 1968) provides that when an instru-
ment is signed while it is incomplete it may not be enforced.
78. 578 S.W.2d at 455-56.
79. See note 76 supra.
80. 581 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
81. In part, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606 (Vernon 1968) provides: "(a) The
holder discharges anyparty to the instrument to the extent that without such party's consent
the holder (1) without express reservation of rights releases . . . anyperson against whom
the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse . (emphasis added).
82. 62 I11. 2d 16, 338 N.E.2d 179 (1975).
83. 95 Idaho 392, 509 P.2d 1313 (1973) (dictum).
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thority,84 there is an equally respectable line of authority to the contrary. 85
The court made no attempt to explain why it chose one line rather than the
other.86 Nevertheless, the precedent is now established despite the failure
of the court to provide any rationale for its decision.
Liability of Commercial Paper Guarantors. Under section 3.416, a guaran-
tee of payment operates to make the liability of a guarantor indistinguish-
able from that of a co-maker and constitutes an undertaking by the
guarantor that "if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it ac-
cording to its tenor without resort by the holder to any other party."' 87 Due
to this "individual" liability, the holder may recover in an action against
the guarantor without joining any other parties, e.g., the maker, as co-
defendants.88 In Ferguson v. McCarrel189 an action on a note was brought
against the corporate maker and the defendant guarantors. Subsequently,
the corporate maker filed a chapter X reorganization petition and as to it
the action on the note was severed and abated. 90 On appeal from an ad-
verse judgment, the guarantors urged that they could not be adjudged lia-
ble on the note in the absence of the maker, without pleading and proof
that the corporation was insolvent. 91 Concluding that the guarantors were
primary and not secondary obligors, the court rejected the argument. 92
The decision is consistent with prior law as developed by the Texas
Supreme Court.93
In Metze v. Entman 94 a guarantor contended that, as a surety, he was
released from liability when the plaintiff consented to an agreement, in
which the defendant also participated, that dissolved the corporate maker.
The court correctly pointed out that the consent of a surety to an act or
84. Similar cases include Peoples Bank v. Pied Piper Retreat, Inc., 209 S.E.2d 573 (W.
Va. 1974), and Oregon Bank v. Baardson, 256 Or. 454, 473 P.2d 1015 (1970).
85. See Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 74 N.J. 45, 376 A.2d 931 (1977); Indianapolis
Morris Plan Corp. v. Karlen, 28 N.Y.2d 30, 268 N.E.2d 632, 319 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1971) (dic-
tum). The dictum in Karlen was subsequently followed in Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Husner, 82
Misc. 2d 550, 369 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
86. For discussion of the interpretation of the 1962 Official Text version of § 3-606
(which is identical to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606 (Vernon 1968)), see J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 432-38. See also Murray, Secured Transactions-Defenses of
Impairment and Improper Care of Collateral, 79 COMM. L.J. 265 (1974).
87. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) (Vernon 1968).
88. See, e.g., Reece v. First State Bank, 566 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1978); Universal Metals
& Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
89. 582 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. The reorganization was filed under I I U.S.C. § 526 (1976) as it existed prior to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, which became effective on Oct. I, 1979.
Reorganizations and arrangements (former ch. X and ch. XI proceedings respectively) have
been merged into a single ch. 11, which has been codified as 11 U.S.C. § § 1101-74 (Supp.
1979).
91. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1986, 2088 (Vernon 1964) (no judgment may
be had against secondary parties unless judgment is also had as to primary obligor except in
certain circumstances; e.g., insolvency of primary obligor).
92. 582 S.W.2d at 541.
93. See Reece v. First State Bank, 556 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1978); Universal Metals &
Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
94. 584 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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agreement discharging the maker prevents the discharge of the surety. The
court, however, cited only case authority95 for this proposition, much of it
pre-Code, and did not mention that the same rule has been carried for-
ward into section 3.606.96
Liabilityfor Contractually Spec!fied Attorney's Fees on Commercial Paper.
In FR Hernandez Construction & Supply Co. v. National Bank of Com-
merce97 the supreme court held that the holder of a promissory note is not
automatically entitled to the contractual percentage for attorney's fees pro-
vided in the note, even when the holder has agreed to pay the attorney at
the specified rate. Instead, the holder is subject to an affirmative defense
by the obligor that the specified fee is unreasonable on the facts of the
particular case. The court noted that the defense of unreasonable attor-
ney's fees is comprised of two elements, on both of which the obligor has
the burden of proof: (1) that the contractual fee is unreasonable; and (2)
that a lesser fee is reasonable under the circumstances of the case. In the
Hernandez case the court held that the defendant maker had met its bur-
den of proof on both elements and was entitled to a reduction of attorney's
fees from the contractual rate of fifteen percent of the balance due
($15,887.51) to the lesser proven amount of a reasonable fee of $10,000.98
C. Enforcement of Commercial Paper
Retail Installment Contracts Do Not Qualify as Commercial Paper. In In-
surance Agency Managers v. Gonzales99 the assignee of a retail installment
contract providing for the purchase of various home improvements argued
that the assignment of the contract qualified as a "negotiation," not under
chapter 3, but under article 5069-6.07 in the Texas Consumer Credit
Code, °0 and that compliance with that provision operated to preclude the
defendant from asserting any claims or defenses. While the argument was
at least ingenious, the court of civil appeals held that "[tihe provisions of
Article 5069-6.07 do not create a new classification of negotiable instru-
ments, but merely impose restrictions upon the ability of a holder of a
retail installment contract to cut off actions or defenses by negotiation of
the instrument."''t1 Because the court further held that the contract did
95. Old Colony Ins. Co. v. City of Quitman, 163 Tex. 144, 352 S.W.2d 452 (1961); Whit-
ten v. Metro Bank, 556 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
96. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606(a)(1) (Vernon 1968).
97. 578 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1979).
98. Id. at 678-79.
99. 578 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
100. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.07 (Vernon 1971) provides:
No right of action or defense of a buyer arising out of a retail installment
transaction which would be cut offby negotiation, shall be cut off by negotiation
• ..to any third party unless such holder acquires the contract relying in good
faith upon a certificate of completion. . . and. . . gives notice of the negotia-
tion to the buyer as provided in this Article, and within thirty days of the
mailing of such notice receives no written notice from the buyer of any facts
giving rise to any claim or defense of the buyer.
(Emphasis added).
101. 578 S.W.2d at 805.
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not qualify as a negotiable instrument under chapter 3, the claimed de-
fenses were not precluded by article 5069--6.07 and could be properly as-
serted. 10 2
Failure of Consideration as a Defense. The importance of becoming a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument is demonstrated by the
case of Worthey v. First State Bank.10 3 In Worthey the plaintiff bank sued
to recover the face amount of a defaulted promissory note from J.D.
Worthey, who had signed the note as maker. As a defense, Worthey con-
tended that he had never received the $8,000 loan amount from the bank.
Instead, he argued that a J.D. Edwards had later signed the note as a co-
maker without Worthey's knowledge and had delivered the instrument to
the bank in exchange for the money. The defendant did not contend that
the bank did not give value, that it had notice of Edwards' activity, or that
it had failed to act in good faith. 104 On motion for summary judgment by
the bank, the trial court held that no issues of material fact existed con-
cerning the bank's status as a holder in due course and that the claimed
defense was, therefore, cut off under section 3.305.105 This decision by the
trial court was affirmed. 0 6
Illegality as a Defense. Not all defenses to commercial paper are cut off by
section 3.305. The usual dividing line depends on a classification of those
defenses that are cut off as "personal defenses" and those defenses that
continue as "real defenses." 0 7 In the latter category are defenses challeng-
ing the legality of the transaction that gave rise to the instrument. In Inter-
national Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Betancourt'08 the knowing participation of
the plaintiff holders in a transaction that involved the smuggling of elec-
tronic devices into Mexico by the defendant makers in violation of Mexi-
can law conclusively established a valid defense of illegality. It made no
difference to the result that the note taken by the holder-payees was not the
original instrument, but was instead a substitute for worthless checks that
102. Id. Article 5069-6.07 makes it clear that its provisions apply only to cases in which
the buyer's defenses may be cut off by negotiation, which, of course, presupposes that the
contract is a negotiable instrument. Thus the court here first examined whether the assigned
contract was negotiable.
103. 573 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
104. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302(a) (Vernon 1968): "A holder in due
course is a holder who takes the instrument (I) for value; and (2) in good faith; and (3)
without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to
it on the part of any person."
105. Id. § 3.305. This section allows a holder in due course to take free of "all defenses
of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt" (emphasis added). Ar-
guably, in Worthey, the bank "dealt with" the defendant maker. See J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 14, at 478-79, 487. The issue, however, was not raised in the case.
106. 573 S.W.2d at 281. The judgment of the trial court was, however, reversed and
remanded on the issue of the reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed by the plaintiff.
See F.R. Hernandez Constr. & Supply Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 578 S.W.2d 675
(Tex. 1979); note 97 supra and accompanying text.
107. The two classifications of defenses are discussed in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 14, at 486-91.
108. 582 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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had initially been given to the payees by the defendants. On this point the
court said, "[w]e think a mere change in the evidence of obligation does
not validate that which is invalid."' 0 9
Fraud as a Defense. Misrepresentations that induce another to sign a ne-
gotiable instrument create a defense of fraud that is cut off by negotiation
of the instrument to a holder in due course.' 1° If the note is not negotiated
and the instrument remains in the hands of a holder who dealt directly
with the maker, however, the defense of fraudulent inducement can still be
raised. " ' I Claims of fraud may, of course, be asserted either defensively as
a means of avoiding payment, or offensively as the basis of a suit for af-
firmative relief, as in the case of Bodovsky P. Texoma National Bank. 2 In
Bodovsky the plaintiff bank brought suit on several promissory notes is-
sued to the bank by the defendant makers in exchange for bank loans.
The notes included various renewal notes that had been signed by the de-
fendants over a three- to four-year period. The defendants asserted that
bank officers had made material and false representations to them about
the worth and resale value of certain restaurant equipment on which the
bank held a lien, and that those misrepresentations were made to induce
the defendants to purchase the equipment and sign the notes as part of the
purchase transaction. This claim of fraud was raised both as an affirma-
tive defense to reduce the bank's attempted recovery on the notes and as a
counterclaim. While the jury held that the evidence supported the allega-
tions of fraudulent misrepresentations and that the defendants did not dis-
cover the falsity until late in 1972, the trial court disregarded these findings
and awarded the plaintiff judgment on the notes. The counterclaim was
held to be barred by the statute of limitations.
The Dallas court of civil appeals held that the unchallenged jury find-
ings supported the use of the fraud defense as a recoupment to reduce the
plaintiffs recovery."13 Although the applicable statute of limitations' 4
would not bar the use of fraud as a defense, it would operate to prevent the
assertion of a counterclaim based on the misrepresentations."15 In a well
researched and comprehensive opinion, Chief Justice Guittard provided a
useful research reference on commercial paper matters involving a defense
or claim of fraud.
Prior Waiver of Holder's Rights as a Defense. The purchaser of a note who
109. Id. at 636.
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305 (Vernon 1968). But see id. § 3.305(2)(c),
which provides that "such misrepresentation as has induced a party to sign the instrument
with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or
essential terms" may be asserted as a defense against a holder in due course. See id. com-
ment 7 (the common example is of a maker tricked into signing a note in the belief it is a
receipt or other document).
11I. Id.; see note 105 supra.
112. 584 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
113. Id. at 876.
114. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958).
115 584 SW2d at 875.
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has knowledge that the note is in default does not qualify as a holder in
due course." 6 He takes the note subject to any defenses the makers may
have, including any waiver of rights that may have been granted to the
makers by the prior holder." 17
Discharge by Agreement as a Defense. Section 3.601(b) operates to dis-
charge a party from liability on an instrument to another party by any act
or agreement that would discharge a simple contract for the payment of
money." 8 In Bank of North America v. Bluewater Maintenance, Inc.119 the
jury found that the maker and payee entered into an oral novation agree-
ment, supported by new consideration, by which a new note was substi-
tuted for an earlier note left in the holder's possession. On appeal, the
court held that the novation was a valid defense to an action by the holder
to enforce the unpaid balance on the earlier note, despite the fact the first
note remained in the holder's possession. 120 Leaving the earlier note with
the holder is not good practice. Under chapter 3 a defense of discharge is a
personal defense that can be cut off by negotiation of the "paid" instru-
ment to a person who qualifies as a holder in due course.' 2'
Notice ofAlteration as a Claim? Against a Holder-in Due Course? Occa-
sionally a case is reported that seems somehow inexplicable-not in the
sense that a court adopts a rule that seems wrong or in the sense that a
holding is extremely vague, but in the sense that it is impossible to tell
exactly what a party is asking the court to do. New Hampshire Insurance
Co. v. Bank of the Southwest122 is such a case. The plaintiff insurance
company sued the defendant bank, which had "cashed" an altered check
and had collected the proceeds therefrom. The check bore obvious indica-
tions of alteration, and a teller at the defendant bank had exercised the
precaution of calling the drawer about the correctness of the check before
cashing it. Unfortunately, the teller took the advice of the person cashing
the check to ask for "Cathy" or "Jan" when making the call to the drawer
and ended up speaking to "Cathy," a participant in the alteration scheme.
Upon being assured that the check was good, the teller turned over cash
for the item. While the evidence tended to raise a valid fact question under
section 3.304123 as to the holder's notice of a claim or defense because of
the "visible evidence of ... alteration," the plaintiff failed to state any
theory of recovery explaining why the defendant bank was liable to it. At
116. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302(a)(3) (Vernon 1968).
117. In re Marriage of Rutherford, 573 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no
writ) (when original holder waived right to foreclose as to past defaults by regular accept-
ance of late payments and failure to give notice that future defaults will provide basis for
foreclosure, purchaser with notice of prior defaults is subject to maker's defense of waiver);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305 (Vernon 1968).
118. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.601(b) (Vernon 1968).
119. 578 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
120. Id. at 842. The court made no reference to any Code section.
121. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.602 (Vernon 1968).
122. 584 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
123. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.304 (Vernon 1968).
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most, the evidence may have defeated the bank's status as holder in due
course, but, as the court pointed out, the status was immaterial because,
"[a]bsent an assignment of error bringing forward a recognized theory of
recovery, this court can grant no relief to the insurance company."' 24 The
court went on to mention various theories that the plaintiff could have
asserted, but did not. In fact, some of them were expressly disclaimed. The
judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant was affirmed.
Evidence in Summary Judgment Commercial Paper Cases. In Dallas
County State Bank v. Thiess 125 the maker of a note pledged certain certifi-
cates of deposit to the holder as collateral. The bank executed against the
certificates when the note became overdue, offsetting some of the maker's
indebtedness. In a suit to collect the balance due on the note, the bank
moved for summary judgment, but failed to attach to its motion certified
copies of the pledge agreement or the certificates of deposit. The trial
court granted the motion, and the Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, affirmed.' 26 The pledge agreement and offset were not elements
of the plaintiffs case, but instead an affirmative defense upon which the
defendant bears the burden of pleading and proof.127 "While it is no
doubt preferable that all documents be attached, in a case such as this
where the missing documents do not pertain to an element of the movant's
suit, . . . Rule 166-A(e) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure will not
require a reversal when the movant fails to attach them."' 128
III. BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. Payments and Collections
Checks Made Payable in a Foreign Currency. The controversy in Lakeway
Co. v. Bravo129 arose when the purchasers under a real estate sales con-
tract made what they believed was the final payment on August 18, 1976,
for the purchase of a lot in Travis County, Texas. The contract stipulated
the total price as "U.S. $25,820.00 (MEX. $322,750.00)." The downpay-
ment was described as "U.S. $5,000.00 (MEX. $62,500.00)." The purchas-
ers, citizens of Mexico, made the down-payment with a check made
payable in pesos. The vendor accepted the check without objection, and it
cleared the United States-Mexico banking and exchange system without
difficulty. For the final payment of the balance due, the purchasers again
issued a check made payable in pesos, which was received by the vendor
without objection and deposited in the vendor's United States bank on
Monday, August 20, 1976. The check for 260,250 pesos was paid by the
Banco National de Mexico on August 30, 1976. One day later the Mexican
Government devalued the peso and, instead of yielding 20,820.00 United
124. 584 S.W.2d at 562.
125. 575 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1978).
126. Id.
127. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
128. 575 S.W.2d at 21.
129. 576 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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States dollars, the check for 260,250 pesos yielded only $12,631.55 (United
States), some $8,188.45 less than the original United States dollar amount
of the final payment. The vendor kept the funds but refused to deliver title
to the property, claiming that the purchasers still owed the $8,188.45 differ-
ence. In the purchasers' suit for specific performance of the contract, the
court held that the payment of the check in due course by the Mexican
bank on August 30, 1976, related back to the date when the check was
delivered and, under section 3.802(a)(2), 130 and the payment of the check
operated to discharge the obligors on the instrument and also on the un-
derlying obligation.131 Specific performance was decreed.
Accountability of Payor Banksfor Late Return of Items. Two cases re-
ported during the survey period involved suits by payees against payor
banks for allegedly excessive bank delays in returning items or sending
notice of dishonor. In Continental National Bank v. Sanders132 a payor
bank held a check for eight days without sending notice of dishonor.
While this time period was substantially longer than the "midnight dead-
line" of section 4.302,133 the payor argued that it had incurred no liability
to the payee because of the payee's waiver of the strict midnight deadline
standard. The waiver, it was claimed, arose by a resubmission of the check
for a second time by the collecting bank. Although the payee had no
knowledge of either the original dishonor or of the resubmission, the payor
bank contended that the collecting bank, as an agent of the payee, could
effectively waive the need for notice of dishonor under section 3.51 l(b)(1).
The court firmly rejected this argument, noting that a waiver traditionally
involves the knowing relinquishment of a right, and that the payee never
knew about the late return or the resubmission.134 The court also pointed
out that the waiver of notice of dishonor under section 3.511 (b)(1) refers to
the waiver of notice by "the party to be charged" and that this was simply
not applicable to the facts of the case. In addition, the court noted that the
agency of the collecting bank was for a limited purpose that did not in-
clude the purpose of waiving any rights the payee might have against the
payor bank. Judgment in favor of the payee under the strict liability rule
130. "Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation
• . . discharge of the underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the obli-
gation." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.802 (Vernon 1968).
131. 576 S.W.2d at 929. For a specific discussion of foreign currency problems under the
Code, see Krahmer, Foreign Currency Instruments and the UCC, TEX. BANK LAW., Mar.
1980, at 1. See generally TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(24), 3.107, 4.212(f)
(Vernon 1968); 3 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-107, 4-212 (2d ed.
1971); J. CLARKE, H. BAILEY & R. YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 98-99 (4th
ed. 1972); id. at 101-02 (3d ed. 1963); [1965] 6 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERVICE 1-363 to -365; 1956 N.Y. LAW. REV. COMM. STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 456; 1955 N.Y. LAW. REV. COMM. STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
1368-69.
132. 581 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
133. The "midnight deadline" is defined as "midnight on [a bank's] next banking day
following the banking day on which it receives the relevant item." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 4.104(a)(8) (Vernon 1968).
134. 581 S.W.2d at 296.
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of section 4.302 was affirmed. The collecting bank was not a party to the
suit and its possible liability under section 4.202135 was not discussed.
In Western Air & Refrigeration, Inc. v. Metro Bank 136 the payee also
sued under section 4.302. In this case, however, the court held that the
payee had reached an agreement with the payor bank that the payor was
to hold the item "for collection" for a period of time, awaiting the availa-
bility of funds in the drawer's account to pay the check. The effect of this
agreement, which was documented by a "hold for collection" receipt given
to the payee, was to change the act of leaving the check with the payor
from a "presentment for payment" under section 3.504, which would trig-
ger section 4.302, into an agreement for the payor to hold the check for a
period of time beyond the midnight deadline in hopes that the drawer's
account would be credited with funds from which payment could be made.
As a necessary incident to its disposition of the case, the court stated that
parties may, by agreement, vary the time requirements of section 4.302.137
An important feature distinguishing these two cases is that in Continen-
tal the payee never knew about the situation surrounding the delay and
resubmission of the check; in Western Air the payee was fully aware of the
lack of funds in the drawer's account and directly negotiated the "hold for
collection" agreement with the payor. The lessons for bank counsel that
emerge from the cases are: (1) do not cross the midnight deadline without
consultation with the owner of the item, preferably documented; and (2)
do not rely on the authority of a collecting bank to reach an agreement
waiving section 4.302.
B. Letters of Credit
Dishonor of Drafts Drawn Under a Credit. Under chapter 5 of the Code,
the issuer of a letter of credit is generally required to honor any draft or
demand for payment that complies with the terms of the credit. 38 The
requirement of honor is absolute if the demand for payment is made by
one who qualifies as a holder in due course and the draft and any required
documents comply on their face with the terms of the credit. 139 The issuer
may choose to dishonor only if the demand for payment is not made by a
holder in due course and the issuer is aware of defects that are not appar-
ent on the face of the documents, such as forgery or fraud. 140 Even in this
situation, as against its customer, the issuer may choose to honor demands
under the credit despite knowledge of forgery, fraud, or the like unless a
court enjoins such honor.' 4' These rules lie at the heart of letter of credit
135. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.202 (Vernon 1968) sets forth the standard of care
a collecting bank must exercise.
136. 599 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1979).
137. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.103(a) (Vernon 1968). See generally J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 556.
138. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(a) (Vernon 1968).
139. Id. § 5.114(b)(1).




transactions, because it is the strong legal compulsion in favor of honoring
the terms of a credit that give such credits their value. A breach of the
duty to honor gives the person affected an automatic right to recover the
face amount of the demand without the need to prove any damages. 142
These primary rules regarding letters of credit were all involved in re-
ported litigation during the current survey period. The case of East Girard
Savings Association v. Citizens National Bank & Trust Co. 143 was decided
under the general duty to honor rule and the measure of damages princi-
ple. Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co. 144 involved the application of the limited
exception permitting dishonor and the concept of injunction against honor.
In East Girard Savings the Citizens National Bank (Citizens) issued a
standby letter of credit to East Girard Savings (Girard) to guaranty the
credit of a general contractor and to induce Girard to provide financing for
an apartment project that the contractor was building. Girard advanced
funds to the contractor during construction, but, upon demand for pay-
ment under the credit, Citizens refused honor, claiming that Girard had
failed to comply with the terms of the letter of credit requiring evidence
that some obligation of the contractor was in default. Girard sued under
the general rule requiring honor on the ground that the letter of credit was
ambiguous as to whether evidence of default was needed and that the am-
biguity should be resolved against Citizens as the drafter of the credit. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas agreed with
Girard and entered judgment against Citizens for the face amount of the
credit. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court noted that:
[an issuing] bank must use the utmost care in drafting its letters of
credit. . . . Banks are presumed to be cognizant of prevailing com-
mercial practices in transacting their business. . . . When a bank es-
chews those practices, it does so at its own peril. If Citizens desired
that it be liable only upon La Vista's default, it should have made
default an express condition of the letter of credit. 145
The court also noted that recovery for the face amount of the credit was
the proper measure of damage. 46
In Siderius both the beneficiary under the credit and the customer who
had procured the issuance of the credit sued the issuing bank. The benefi-
ciary sought to compel honor after the bank had refused payment because
of fraud on the part of the beneficiary. The customer, in a separate action,
sought an injunction to prevent honor by the bank. The two actions were
consolidated for trial and the bank's refusal to honor the credit was held to
142. Id. § 5.115(a).
143. 593 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1979).
144. 583 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
145. 593 F.2d at 602-03. Unfortunately for Citizens, it attempted to draft a guaranty
letter of credit on a form designed for a letter of credit involving a sale of merchandise. The
use of the wrong form made the attempt to specify the required accompanying documents
meaningless. Although the parties clearly intended that notice of default was to be a precon-
dition to Citizens' liability as an issuer, "[aln issuer's liability on a letter of credit is con-
trolled solely by the terms of that letter." Id. at 602.
146. Id at 603.
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be proper under the limited exception to section 5.114(b)(2) discussed
above.147 The trial court's decision was upheld.
C. Texas Banking Code
Confidentiality of Banking Department Records. In Stewart v. McCain148
the Texas Supreme Court held that article 342-210 of the Texas Banking
Code 149 establishes an absolute privilege on the part of the Banking De-
partment to refuse to divulge information concerning the confidential sec-
tion of a bank examination report. The court noted that an earlier opinion
of the attorney general had concluded that the Texas Open Records Act' 50
did not apply to financial information compiled under article 342-210.1'1
IV. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
In Reed v. White, Weld & Co. 152 the plaintiff brought a conversion ac-
tion against a broker for the wrongful sale of securities. The securities had
been part of an estate and were sold by the broker under instructions by
one of three executors who did not have authority to order the sale. The
broker, however, had accounted to the estate for the full market value of
the shares and the plaintiffs, who were beneficiaries under the estate,
sought damages only for the interest the shares would have earned during
their lifetimes had they not been sold. The court held that the conversion
action would not lie for the future earnings because the plaintiffs had al-
ready been fully compensated and could simply purchase the same securi-
ties on the market to earn the future interest. 53 The plaintiffs did not
allege any special damage or any fraud on the part of the broker. Al-
though not discussed, the provisions of section 8.318 of the Code may be
usefully compared with the decision in Reed.'54
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Validity of Security Agreement
Retail Installment Sales and Chapter 9. While a commercial transaction
may validly include a waiver of defenses clause under the terms of section
9.206, that section is expressly made "[s]ubject to any statute or decision
which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer
goods."'5"
One such statute is article 5069-7.07(6) of the Texas Consumer Credit
147. See text at note 140 supra.
148. 575 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1978).
149. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210 (Vernon 1973).
150. Id. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
151. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-147 (1976).
152. 571 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
153. Id. at 397.
154. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 8.318 (Vernon 1968) provides that an agent who
sells securities in good faith according to the instructions of his principal is not liable for
coversion although the principal had no right to dispose of them.
155. Id. § 9.206(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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Code, 156 which prohibits the use of waiver of defense clauses in consumer
motor vehicle transactions. In Horn v. Nationwide Financial Corp.157 it
was held that the inclusion of such a clause in violation of article 5069-
7.07(6) permitted the consumer-buyers to recover the automatic penalty
amounts specified by the Consumer Credit Code158 and that both the seller
and the assignee were liable for the violation.
In Martens v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.159 the plaintiffs also al-
leged a violation of the Consumer Credit Code. The retail installment
contract used by GMAC contained a clause that provided, inter alia, that
in the event of a default the seller could "take immediate possession of said
[secured] property without demand . . .and for this purpose seller may
enter upon the premises where said property may be and remove same."
The contract also authorized the secured party to take possession of any
other property contained in the secured motor vehicle at the time of repos-
session "and hold same for buyer at buyer's risk without liability on the
part of seller." The plaintiff buyers contended that this clause purported to
waive the buyers' right to sue the secured party for breaches of the peace
and other illegal acts committed in the repossession of the secured motor
vehicle. The plaintiffs alleged that this waiver of rights violated article
5069-7.07(4),160 which prohibits the use of a clause waiving the buyer's
rights of action against the seller or assignee for any illegal acts committed
in the repossession of goods. The court held that the clause in question,
although subject to the interpretation that it operated as a waiver in viola-
tion of the Consumer Credit Code, did not contain express language of
waiver and could be "more reasonably construed to comply with the
Code."'161 The court distinguished Southwestern Investment Co. v. Man-
nix162 and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cole,163 but the distinctions are not
persuasive. Caution should be exercised in relying on Martens as a prece-
dent.
Truth In Lending Disclosures in Security Agreement. In Chapman v.
Miller'64 the failure of a seller to put the required description of a retained
security interest on the same side of a retail installment contract as the
space for the buyer's signature was held to violate section 226.8(a)(1) of
regulation Z.' 65 The transaction was not saved by an interpretive ruling of
156. The statute was amended in 1979, but subsection (6) was not changed. Compare
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(6) (Vernon 1977) with id. art. 5069-7.07(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1980).
157. 574 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ retd n.r.e.).
158. The penalties for a violation of the Consumer Credit Code are contained in TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
159. 584 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
160. See note 156 supra. The current version of § 4 remains the same. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
161. 584 S.W.2d at 944.
162. 557 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
163. 503 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ dism'd).
164. 575 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ retd n.r.e.).
165. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-.1503 (1979).
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the Federal Reserve Board allowing disclosures to be made on both sides
of a document that combines an installment sales contract with a security
agreement.166 That ruling requires the space for the buyer's signature to
be located at the end of the document; the signature space in Chapman was
at the bottom of the face side and not at the end on the reverse side. An
attempted incorporation by reference to the disclosures on the reverse side
of the agreement was also ineffective because the incorporating language
appeared below the buyer's signature line on the face side. The decision in
Chapman should be read in light of the later Texas Supreme Court opin-
ion in General Electric Credit Corp. v. Small. 167
B. Perfection and Attachment-Legislative Developments
Purchase Money Security Interests. Since the original enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code in Texas in 1966, sections 9.301(b) and
9.312(d) have provided for a ten-day grace period for the perfection of
purchase money security interests. The grace period allows the "relation-
back" of delayed filings made within the ten-day period against interven-
ing parties claiming an interest in the same collateral.168
An amendment during the last legislative session extended the purchase
money grace period from ten days to twenty days in both section 9.301(b)
and section 9.312(d). 169 In the opinion of the author, the extension of this
time period for delayed filings should be approached with great caution
and should be used only in cases of necessity when filing within ten days is
simply impossible. Reliance on the increased time period should not be-
come habitual. The reason for this rather emphatic caveat is that the new
Federal Bankruptcy Code,170 which became effective October 1, 1979, per-
mits only a ten-day grace period for the delayed filing of security inter-
ests.' 7 ' A delay of more than ten days will permit the trustee in
bankruptcy to assert that the claimed security interest is void as a prefer-
ence under the extensively revised and strengthened preference section of
the Bankruptcy Code. 172 Because the gift of prescience is not common
166. Id. § 226.801. The regulations and rulings are promulgated under the authority of
the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67e (1976).
167. 584 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1979). In GeneralElectric the Texas Supreme Court carefully
distinguished Federal Reserve Board regulations pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act from
Federal Reserve Board interpretations of regulation Z. The latter are entitled to deference
on the part of the courts, while the former are, in effect, "legislative rules." The court held
that the interpretive ruling argued in Chapman v. Miller, see note 164 supra and accompany-
ing text, had a very limited application to forms designed for electrical processing and did
not apply to the facts of the case. In its discussion of § 226.8(a) of regulation Z the court
concluded that all of the required disclosures of § 226.8(b) were on the face of the agreement
above the buyer's signature. Since the interpretive ruling did not apply, the fact that the
buyer's signature was not below the full content of the agreement was immaterial. Id. at
693-97. The court also raised, but did not decide, the propriety of a defense of substantial
compliance to a charge of a violation of the Truth in Lending Act. Id.
168. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 918-20.
169. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 318, §§ 1-2, at 723.
170. I1 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (Supp. 1979).
171. Id. § 547(e)(2).
172. Id. § 547.
[Vol. 34
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
among secured creditors, a debtor's future bankruptcy should always be
considered a potential risk, and filing within ten instead of twenty days is a
virtually cost free means of avoiding a substantial part of that risk. In
sum, ignore the section 9.301(b) and 9.312(d) amendments and file quickly.
Security Interests in Boats and Motors. Section 9.302 of the Code provides
for the perfection of security interests in property covered by certificate of
title statutes to be by notation on the certificate rather than by filing of a
financing statement. 173 Since 1977 the Parks and Wildlife Code has pro-
vided for the issuance of certificates of title on motorboats and outboard
motors. 174 By amendments added during the last legislative session, such
certificates of title may now be issued, and liens noted thereon, by county
tax assessors and collectors as well as by the Parks and Wildlife Depart-
ment.175
In Olson v. Holmes, 17 6 another truth in lending case, the seller described
the retained security interest on the face of the security agreement above
the space for the buyer's signature; on the reverse side, however, the seller
listed the remedies available to him as a secured seller. The Austin court
of civil apeals held that, under federal court interpretations of regulation
Z, this listing was unnecessary because the description on the face was an
adequate disclosure. 77 The existence of this unnecessary listing did not,
therefore, violate the Truth in Lending Act or regulation Z. On appeal, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the court of civil appeals had properly
referred to federal rather than state case law to interpret the Truth in
Lending Act. 178 The earlier opinion by another court of civil appeals in
McDonald v. Savoy 179 was disapproved to the extent that it conflicted with
the federal interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act applied in Olson. 180
Assignment as Sale orfor Security. In Berman, Fichtner & Mitchell, Inc. v.
Kahn181 the Eastland court of civil appeals refused to permit an assignee
to show by parol evidence that an assignment of an interest in collateral
was intended for security only and not as a discharge of a debt, when the
assignment agreement described the assignment as being for the purpose
of discharging an obligation for attorney's fees. The court squarely re-
jected the "argument that an assignee may always show by parol evidence
that an assignment, absolute on its face, was intended only as security for a
debt." 8
2
173. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
174. TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE §§ 31.045-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
175. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 607, §§ 1-5, at 1352-53.
176. 571 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 587
S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979).
177. The court cited the leading case of Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1976), in support of its decision.
178. Holmes v. Olson, 587 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam).
179. 501 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ).
180. 587 S.W.2d at 679.
181. 573 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).




Priorities in Cases Involving Federal Agencies. A continuing problem of
some importance has been the determination of what law applies to a com-
mercial transaction when one of the parties to the transaction is an agency
of the federal government. Since the decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States,183 the United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that federal law is to be applied to determine the rights of the United
States when it is a party to a commercial dispute. While the decisions have
been consistent regarding the choice of a source of law, however, there has
been great inconsistency in determining the content of the law. 184
A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc. 85 has remedied much of the inconsistency with a de-
termination that, in cases involving the application of state laws that do
not discriminate between federal agencies and private lenders, e.g., the
Uniform Commercial Code, the content of the federal law is to be found
by incorporation of the state law. An example is the priority rules of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code that were involved in the Kimbell
case. 186 The Court explicitly limited its holding to voluntary agency loan
activities in order to prevent the application of the Kimbell doctrine to
federal tax lien situations, which would present problems of special federal
interest because of the involuntary nature of government tax lien claims. ' 87
In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Texas Thermal Industries, Inc.' 88 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had occasion to consider the relative priority
of a federal tax lien vis-a-vis a properly perfected chapter 9 security inter-
est. While Aetna was reported shortly before Kimbell was handed down,
Aetna is consistent with the Supreme Court decision. In Aetna the court
held that the Small Business Administration, the holder of a security inter-
est properly perfected by filing, had priority over a federal tax lien filed
some months later. 189 The court reasoned that the Federal Tax Lien Act
of 1966190 had made the "choateness doctrine"' 9' inapplicable to cases
covered by the Act. Subsections 6323(a) and (h)(1) explicitly provide that
183. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
184. Compare United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971) (content determined by
reference to model uniform act), with United States v. Oswald & Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886 (3d
Cir. 1965) (content determined by reference to federal common law).
185. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
186. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.312, .314 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980), cited in
Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1977).
187. 440 U.S. at 729.
188. 591 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1979).
189. Id. at 1039.
190. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6323 (1976).
191. The choateness doctrine is a principle of federal common law governing priority
conflicts between nonfederal liens or obligations and federal claims for the collection of
debts owing the United States. Prior to 1966 the United States Supreme Court had held that
in order for a nonfederal lien to prevail over a later filed federal tax lien, "the identity of the
lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien," must be established as of
the date of filing of notice of the tax lien. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84
(1953). See generally Kennedy, The Relative Priority ofthe Federal Government. The Perni-
cious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954).
[Vol. 34
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
perfected security interests have priority over later federal tax liens. Be-
cause the collateral originally claimed by the secured party had been de-
stroyed by fire and the parties were seeking recovery against insurance
proceeds, the court also needed to determine whether insurance proceeds
were "proceeds" of collateral within the meaning of that term in section
9.306. Looking to state law, the court found no decisions directly on point
under the 1966 version of the Code. 192 It was persuaded, however, by the
amendment of section 9.306 in 1973193 that the original intent underlying
the earlier version was to include insurance within the scope of "pro-
ceeds." 194
Secured Party as Chapter 2 "Good Faith Purchaser. " It is important to
recognize that one of the secured party's principal rights is contained, not
in chapter 9, but in section 2.403 of chapter 2. In pertinent part, that sec-
tion provides, "A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value." 195 A secured party can qualify as
as a good faith purchaser for value under the Code definitions.' 96 A clas-
sic fact situation illustrating the operation of section 2.403 was presented in
Leif Johnson Ford, Inc. v. Chase National Bank. 197 In that case, the seller
sold two trucks to buyer, who paid by check and obtained "clean" certifi-
cates of title to the vehicles three days later. On the basis of these certifi-
cates, buyer then obtained a loan from the bank, which took a security
interest in the trucks and promptly filed an application with the Texas
Highway Department to have the certificates amended to reflect the bank's
lien. Shortly thereafter, the seller learned that the buyer's check had failed
to clear due to insufficient funds and sought to file its own amendment on
the certificates to claim a lien in its own favor. When the seller and the
bank learned of their competing claims to the trucks, litigation com-
menced. The trial court awarded the plaintiff bank partial summary judg-
ment that its lien had priority. On appeal, the court held that section 2.403
gave the bank the rights of a good faith purchaser for value with priority
over the claim of the unpaid seller.' 98
Continuation of Security Interest in Sold Collateral. Section 9.306(b) pro-
vides in effect that a security interest continues in collateral, notwithstand-
ing sale, exchange, or other disposition, unless: (1) chapter 9 itself contains
a rule effecting a "cut-off' of the security interest upon disposition;' 99 or
(2) the secured party authorizes disposition in the security agreement or
otherwise.2oo
192. 1966 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 785, § 1, at 2534-36.
193. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 400, § 5, at 1012-14.
194. 591 F.2d at 1039.
195. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(a) (Vernon 1968).
196. Id. §§ 1.201(19), (32), (33), (44).
197. 578 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
198. Id. at 794.
199. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.307-.309 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
200. Disposition might be authorized by explicit statement in the security agreement as,
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Two cases were decided during the survey period involving the continu-
ation of a security interest in collateral despite sale of that collateral by the
debtor. In Fisher v. First National Bank 20' the sale of cattle by a farmer to
a purchaser did not operate to cut off a security interest in the cattle. The
purchaser argued that the secured party had "authorized" the sale by a
prior course of conduct of permitting the farmer to sell cattle without ob-
jection, despite the existence of a "no-sale without consent" clause in the
security agreement. On this point, the court discussed the case of Clovis
National Bank v. Thomas,202 which squarely supported the purchaser's po-
sition, but noted several contrary decisions from other jurisdictions. 20 3 Af-
ter an analysis of the competing arguments, the court expressly declined to
follow the rule of Thomas and held that no authorization of the sale had
occurred.2°4 Judgment was rendered in favor of the secured party.
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Uresti20 5 the court held that the security
interest of a secured party continued in a tractor despite sale of the tractor
by the debtor to a third party. The secured party was allowed recovery
against the third party purchaser, subject to a claim by the debtor and
purchaser that the security agreement contained provisions violating the
Federal Truth in Lending Act and the State Consumer Credit Code. The
case was remanded for trial on these issues.
D. Default, Repossession, and Resale of Collateral
Default and Acceleration. It has been widely recognized that default is
"whatever the security agreement says it is."'2° 6 The only Code limitation
on this concept is the doctrine of good faith.207 Likewise, when a default
triggers an acceleration clause, the only limitation on the ability to acceler-
ate is that of good faith.208 The burden of proving a lack of good faith is
on the debtor.209
In Sparkman v. Peoples National Bank210 the debtor sued the secured
party for conversion of the collateral covered by the security agreement,
alleging that no default had occurred and that the secured debt had been
accelerated in bad faith. A second count for slander was also alleged in
the petition. The court recognized that the burden of proof on the issues of
default and lack of good faith were on the debtor and held that this burden
for example, when the collateral is inventory and resale is expected; it might also be author-
ized by independent action or agreement outside of the original security agreement.
201. 584 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
202. 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967).
203. Wabasso State Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 308 Minn. 349, 251 N.W.2d 321
(1976); Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99, 108 (1971).
204. 584 S.W.2d at 519.
205. 581 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
206. J. WHITE & R. SUMMMERS, supra note 14, at 956 (quoting 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1193 (1965)).
207. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Vernon 1968).
208. Id. § 1.208.
209. Id.
210. 580 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.),former appeal
reported, 501 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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had not been met. The issue of whether a slander had occurred was re-
manded for trial.
Reasonableness of Notice and Resale of Collateral. Section 9.504(c) of the
Code requires that a secured party send reasonable notice of the time and
place for the resale of collateral after repossession. In Byrd v. General Mo-
torsAcceptance Corp.211 it was held that the mailing of notices to the joint
debtors by both regular and certified mail more than ten days before the
sale was conducted satisfied the statutory requirement that notice be
"sent. ' '212 The evidence showed that the letters sent by regular mail were
never returned to the sender and that a return receipt for one of the certi-
fied letters was signed by one of the joint debtors and returned to the se-
cured party. The certified letter sent to the other debtor was returned
unclaimed after the post office had twice notified him that the letter was
being held. The return of this letter was held not to vitiate the notice under
the circumstances of the case.
In Siboney Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.213 it was held that the
omission of the words "Houston, Texas" after a street address in a notice
that contained several other references to "Houston" presented a fact issue
on which a jury could conclude that the notice was reasonable. An issue
was also raised as to whether the sale itself was conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. In an opinion detailing the manner of resale,
the court held that the resale was commercially reasonable. 214 The court
found that evidence supporting the commercial reasonableness included
the following elements: a depressed market, notice to the debtor, newspa-
per publicity of the sale, adequate opportunity for inspection, acceptance
of the highest bid, and minimal sale expenses. 215
Failure to Resell in a Commercially Reasonable Manner. If it is established
that a secured party has failed to resell collateral in a commercially reason-
able manner, a presumption arises that the value of the collateral was
equal to the amount of the debt; the burden of going forward with evi-
dence to overcome the presumption is on the secured party. 216 This rule
was adopted in Tackett v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 2 17 in which the
secured party converted collateral to its own use and failed to offer any
evidence of the fair market value of the collateral on the date of conver-
sion. A take nothing judgment was rendered against the secured party.
The latest chapter in the saga of Maxey v. Texas Commerce Bank218 was
211. 581 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
212. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
213. 572 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
214. Id. at 7-8.
215. Id. at 7 (citing Pruske v. National Bank of Commerce, 533 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ)).
216. O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 551 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1977), noted in 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 560 (1977).
217. 579 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
218. 571 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Armarillo 1978), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 580
S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1979). This judgment is the latest in the tortuous history of a case that was
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reported during the survey period. The Amarillo court of civil appeals had
held that the debtor had introduced ample evidence to support jury find-
ings that the defendant secured party had not conducted a commercially
reasonable resale and had acted with a lack of good faith in the resale
proceedings. The jury findings on the issue of damages, however, were
against the great weight of the evidence, and the trial judge erred in substi-
tuting his own findings on the damage issues. The case was once again
remanded for another trial. An appeal to the Texas Supreme Court was
refused, the court stating that it did not "have jurisdiction to pass upon the
fact question of the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 219
Motor Vehicle Possessory Liens-Legislative Developments. Section 9.310
of the Code grants a priority to the holder of a possessory mechanic's lien
on secured property.220 The Certificate of Title Act 22' and the motor vehi-
cle possessory lien statutes222 have been amended to provide a new method
of enforcement by holders of possessory liens on motor vehicles. Such
liens generally cover the cost of repair charges. 223
Under the new sale procedure, when the motor vehicle has remained in
the possession of the lien holder for thirty days and the charges remain
unpaid, in order to sell the vehicle, the lien holder must give written notice
of the accumulated charges and a demand for payment to the owner and to
all lienholders, ie., secured parties whose liens are noted on the certificate
of title.224 If the charges are not paid within thirty days from the date the
notice was mailed, the vehicle may be sold at public sale and the proceeds
applied to the debt.225 A new certificate of title may be issued to the pur-
chaser upon the affidavit of the lienholder that the required notice was
given and the sale conducted in accordance with the statutes.226
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
Guaranty Agreements. In Prather v. Citizens National Bank227 the guaran-
tor and the creditor bank allegedly reached an agreement that the bank
would release the guarantor from further indebtedness if a payment of
first tried in 1970, reversed and remanded for insufficient evidence in Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Maxey, 461 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). At retrial, sum-
mary judgment was granted to the bank, which was upheld in Maxey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank,
489 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972). The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
second appellate decision, and remanded for a new trial in Maxey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank,
507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1974). The decisions reported here result from appeals from the third
trial of the case.
219. Maxey v. Texas Commerce Bank, 580 S.W.2d 340, 340 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam).
220. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (Vernon Supp. 1980). The priority of the
mechanic over the secured party under § 9.310 was discussed and applied in Gulf Coast
State Bank v. Nelms, 525 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1975).
221. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1, §§ 1-65 (Vernon 1977).
222. Id. arts. 5502-04 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1980).
223. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 490, §§ 2-3, at 1059-60.
224. Id. § 2, at 1060.
225. Id.
226. Id. § 3, at 1060.
227. 582 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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$28,000 was made on a $140,000 debt. Although the evidence on whether
such an agreement had been made was conflicting, the court held there
was no need to resolve the evidentiary conflict because, under any view of
the facts, there was no consideration to support the alleged accord and
satisfaction. 228 In First National Bank v. Love229 it was held that parol
evidence could not be introduced to contradict or vary the clear terms of a
guaranty agreement creating an unconditional obligation to pay.
In Thompson v. Preston State Bank,230 in which a credit card account
was under an absolute and unlimited guaranty agreement, the Dallas court
of civil appeals held that the guarantor of the account was not relieved of
liability by actions of the bank administering the credit card account when
the bank both increased the credit limit on the account without notice to
the guarantor and negligently allowed the cardholder to make purchases
beyond the credit limit. The court, however, held that by its own terms the
guaranty was limited to "purchases" and did not extend to "finance
charges." Therefore, the guarantor was liable only for interest at the legal
rate from the date of default and not for interest at the credit card contract
rate.23'
Liquidated Damages Clauses. In Krenek v. Wang Laboratories, Inc.232 and
Mayfield v. Hick 233 liquidated damages clauses contained in equipment
lease agreements were held void as penalty provisions because the clauses
could be invoked for any default, no matter how minor. The courts rea-
soned that there was, therefore, no reasonable relation between the
amounts specified as liquidated damages and the amount of actual dam-
ages resulting from a default.
Statute of Limitations-Legislative Developments. The statute of limita-
tions on actions for debts not evidenced by a writing and for stated and
open accounts has been extended from two to four years.2 34 This amend-
ment conforms articles 5526 and 5527 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes
to the four-year time period for contract actions involving goods stated in
section 2.725 of the Business and Commerce Code.
228. Id. at 907.
229. 584 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ dism'd).
230. 575 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
231. Id. at 315.
232. 583 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
233. 575 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
234. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 716, § 2, at 1769 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT ANN.
art. 5527 (Vernon Supp. 1980)).
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